In these strange and uncertain times – prompted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the global energy and cost-of-living crisis that it has triggered – some positive things happen: last Wednesday Turkey and Israel announced a full restoration of diplomatic ties after years of troubled relations.

 Why now? The answer is long and quite complicated. It is about mutual and overlapping national interests created by changing strategic and economic issues across the Middle East and the wider world.

 Ankara and Tel Aviv have been criticised in the West for their placid and underwhelming responses to Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine – and rightly so. Turkey is the only member of Nato that has mediated a diplomatic effort with Russia, supported by the UN, to allow the worldwide shipment of grain from Ukraine via the Black Sea. And Israel, despite American pressure, has ruled out supplying Kyiv with any offensive weapons.

 The announcement ends a four-year diplomatic crisis that led to downgraded relations between the two non-Arab regional powers. Israel’s Prime Minister Yair Lapid and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke and agreed on reinstating their respective ambassadors and consul-generals. Lapid said in a statement that "restoring ties with Turkey is an important asset to the stability of the region and bears great economic significance to Israel's citizens.” President Isaac Herzog also welcomed the renewal of diplomatic ties with Turkey, calling it an "important development.”

 Next year, there will be a presidential election in Turkey. But with inflation at over 70% Ankara wants to attract investment from regional countries. There are security challenges, too, in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean basin. Turkey sees Israel as a strong player, and for Israel, Turkey is seen as a balancing power in a region threatened by Iran. The move, which comes as Israel has sought to improve ties with regional powers, was agreed two years after the Abraham Accords, which saw relations normalised between Israel, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

 Relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have been rocky since 2011, when Turkey expelled Israel's ambassador after a UN report into Israel's attack on the Mavi Marmara aid ship to Gaza in 2010, which killed nine Turkish nationals. The rift was healed in 2016 when full relations were restored and both countries sent their ambassadors back. But tensions were renewed in 2018 when Israeli forces killed scores of Palestinians taking part in the Great March of Return protests in Gaza.

 Turkey launched a charm offensive in 2020 to repair ties with estranged rivals, making overtures to Egypt, the UAE, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Efforts with Cairo have so far yielded little progress, but normalisation work with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is going well.

 Yet despite the lack of high-level diplomatic relations, Israel has retained several back-channel communication methods with Turkey.

In March, Presidents Herzog and Erdogan met in Ankara, marking the first visit by an Israeli statesman in 14 years, issued a joint statement at the end of Herzog's trip. Erdogan said that the meeting was "historic and will serve as a turning point in the relations between the two countries.” In June eight Iranians were detained on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack on Israeli tourists.

 But Israeli politicians admit they are concerned that more flip-flopping on the part of the Turkish leader, especially concerning the Palestinian question, might lead to another breakdown. One of Israel’s main demands ahead of advancing ties is that Ankara work harder to stop the Gaza-based Islamist movement Hamas’s activities in Turkey, and that it take a hard line against Hamas actions against Israelis. The fact that Hamas stayed out of the latest flare-up in Gaza may provide a clue about future cooperation.

 At the same time, Israel and Turkey both want to strengthen coordination with each other when it comes to their attacks in Syria. Both see the Iranian presence in Syria as a threat to their stability, each is active in the air over Syria and each is dealing with the Russian military presence there. It is impossible for Israel to contain both Iran and Turkey, which have really considerable military and intelligence capabilities.

 Another factor is the chaotic American withdrawal from Afghanistan which emphasised for regional actors the wish of the US to reduce its presence in the region, and that they have to work together to maintain the regional order.

 Both countries hold an interest in improving dialogue on this issue to prevent Turkish harm to Israeli aircraft and vice versa. They have also recently been discussing the possibility of cooperation in what has been defined as “regional architecture,” in an attempt to restrict terror by Iranians who are working to gain a foothold in Syria.

 Turkish and Israeli officials have both said that the prospect of bringing Israeli gas to Turkey through a pipeline in the eastern Mediterranean was a chief incentive to repair their relationship. With events in Ukraine focusing a sense of urgency on natural gas, combined with Turkey's recent rapprochement efforts with Israel and other Middle Eastern countries.

 In an increasingly unpredictable world, nobody should be surprised that Turkey and Israel are prioritising their own national interests.

 

BY: IAN BLACK