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The Syrians and the Possibility of Learning Politics
The Syrians and the Possibility of Learning Politics
**Osama Hanidi**
At the end of his book titled *The Syrian Baath*, Lebanese journalist Hazem Saghieh writes a very striking phrase:
*"That regime reaped the storm after sowing the wind, turning its country into a playground and reigniting the conflict over Syria from anew, in the worst and most dangerous forms. Because it sowed a lot of wind, it is expected that the storm will be very powerful, and with it, Syrians will learn politics under very harsh conditions."*
The first remarkable point in Saghieh's conclusion, which traced the vile Baathist experiment from its origins until the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, is the strength of that storm which devastated Syria—its people, stones, economy, and security—transforming it into a ruined land. This devastation culminated in the fleeing of the regime's head on the morning of December 8, 2025.
The second notable point in the words of this seasoned journalist and esteemed Lebanese writer is the very harsh conditions he mentioned, under which Syrians will have to learn politics once again, amid all these storms.
What, then, are these embedded harsh conditions in Hazem's words? And is it possible to ease the burden of these harshnesses on Syrians so they might learn politics, after being deprived of it for decades due to the oppressive security state's grip and its disbanding of Syrian society from engaging in public affairs, let alone politics?
Perhaps Hazem Saghieh didn’t imagine the dramatic scene that the Syrians woke up to after Bashar al-Assad's escape and the start of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham taking over the reins of power in Syria. But international arrangements likely do not consult anyone when they decide. Consequently, about four months after the group's rule, and following a weak national dialogue, foreign appointments within the army, issuance of a constitutional declaration making Islamic jurisprudence a primary source of legislation, neglecting the linguistic rights of Syrian Kurds, and the formation of an interim government, the harshness of these conditions seems to have increased for starting political work in Syria—for several reasons, the most important of which are:
The Anticipated Political Life in the ..New Syria
**First:**
The history of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its leader (Al-Joulani), rooted in Salafi-jihadi ideology—from the Iraqi experience, through the founding of Jabhat al-Nusra, then Fath al-Sham, and finally Hayat Tahrir al-Sham itself. It can be said that the current authority in Damascus failed spectacularly in its first test just months after its international installation at the People’s Palace, when security personnel were targeted by remnants of the regime. It allowed hordes of foreigners and extremist jihadis to commit terrible massacres in the Syrian coast in early March, which reinforced many people's view that this authority is based on an ideology of loyalty and betrayal rather than on the rule of civil values and political freedoms. Following that same ideology, democracy—the necessary condition for political work—is considered an innovation and heresy: sovereignty belongs to God, not the people, and its social contract is an alliance between God and the ruler.
The same authority also failed its second test when it was unable or unwilling to intervene in or even acknowledge what happened in Daraa and Sahnaya, where arms were used against civilians following a voice recording attributed to a person said to be Druze, who insulted the Prophet Muhammad. This led to the attack by angry sectarian mobs, still under the influence of their sectarian fury, toward the students of Sweida in Homs, and then calls for the expulsion of the Druze. Some protesters in Hama and Damascus also issued such calls at night, leading to clashes on the outskirts of Daraa, resulting in the death of several youths from the city, who faced these sectarian mobs. The tensions then extended to Sahnaya, which remains tense until the writing of these lines.
Therefore, the task of learning politics under this authority appears impossible—because we are facing a new form of tyranny that has not yet spoken a word about democracy, nor is it expected to do so in the foreseeable future. The word "nationalism" is also seemingly unwelcome, as their main allegiance is to the nation—here, of course, meaning only Islamic nation, which they imagine in this limited way.
**Second:**
The lack of reliable political coalitions, especially among those bodies that tried to represent the Syrian revolution—from the National Council to the Syrian Opposition and Revolutionary Forces Coalition—which has turned into a platform for the Muslim Brotherhood, and which has fallen from the favor of most Syrians due to poor performance and corruption that was deeply ingrained. It is unlikely in the foreseeable future that the old party structures, dominated by ideological trends or those newly emerging, will play a decisive political role, due to the immaturity of
