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Thursday, 25 April 2024
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Where will the Muslim Brotherhood go if Turkish-Egyptian problems are settled?
Sami Moubayed

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Egypt is confused—with due right. They do not really know what to make of the rapprochement in-the-making between their home country, Egypt, and host country, Turkey. For the past month there has been plenty of talk about Ankara abandoning the MB, peddled mainly by the Saudi al-Arabiya TV. Among other things, al-Arabiya said that Turkey was reviewing the residency permits of Egyptian members of the MB while investigating their bank accounts and financial dealings. Muslim Brotherhood


The reports said that some members of the MB had been arrested and others were earmarked for deportation to Egypt. That of course was in addition to asking three Egyptian opposition channels based in Turkey to tone down their criticism of President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. The three channels, El-Sharq, Watan TV, and Mekameleen, were threatened with fines if they defied orders of the Turkish government.


That put the MB on high alert, fearing a sudden abandonment by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Turkish leader has done it before, after all, giving them plenty of reason to worry. He sold out his Syrian proxies in Aleppo back in the summer of 2016, in order to march on the cities of Jarablus, Azaz, and al-Bab. He did it again in mid-2018, abandoning the Turkish-backed groups in East Ghouta in exchange for sending his proxies to overrun the city of Afrin. If full normalization with Egypt was now on the table, there was no reason why he wouldn’t give serious consideration to abandoning the Egyptian MB, who leaders have been living in Turkey since coup against President Mohammad Morsi eight years ago.


Assurances by Turkey


The Acting Guide of the Egyptian MB Ibrahim Munir came out to assure his followers on 20 March 2021, via the Doha-based al-Jazeera TV. He said that Turkey had no intention of withdrawing support or asking the MB to leave Turkish territory, asking his men to trust President Erdogan. When that statement did not sooth their worries, Erdogan’s adviser Yasin Aktay appeared on same television channel, denying reports of any divorce between his boss and the MB. This week, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu went a step further, issuing a third assurance, saying that his country did not approve of Egypt’s labeling of the MB as a terrorist organization. “We were against the coup in Egypt” he said, in reference to the 2003 toppling of Morsi, “not because it was the Muslim Brotherhood.” The Turkish minister added: “If Sisi was in office that day and somebody else had carried out a coup, we would shown the same principled stance.”


Despite all the above, the Egyptian MB realizes that its fate remains on the negotiating table between Turkey and Egypt just like it was on the Saudi-Qatari one. The Emir of Qatar Tamim Bin Hamad had famously refused distancing his country from the MB, sustaining three years of boycott by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Their condition for lifting the siege was to expel members of the MB from Doha (including members of its Palestinian branch Hamas), stop supporting Islamic groups across the region, and moderate the editorial policy of al-Jazeera. That did not work, however, and Qatar returned to the family of Gulf nations last year, without having to fulfil any of those demands. Turkey is not Qatar, however, and has none of the financial means that allow its leader to defy the world for the sake of the MB. Its only strength is the ideological affiliation between Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the MB, with the Turkish leader himself being a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood.


One blow after another


Last April the MB suffered a heavy blow when their ally in Sudan, President Omar al-Bashir, was overthrown by popular revolution. Two months later, Saudi Arabia used its heavyweight influence to convince King Abdullah II into closing the main branch of the MB in Jordan. That was a major setback for the MB, who had relied heavily on Jordan for their Middle East network, given that the Hashemite Kingdom was the one country where MB activities were legalized by the state and in which they were active both within the state apparatus and throughout civil society. The MB had been eying Amman as a Plan B, when and if they were asked to leave Qatar or Turkey. In December 2019, they scrambled to host a conference on the Dead Sea, showering King Abdullah with praise. That was just weeks after The Wall Street Journal broke the story of an unannounced visit by Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammad Bin Abdulrahman Al Thani to Riyadh, discussing ways to improve Qatari-Saudi relations, at the expense of the MB.


Jordan is now obviously not an option for the MB. Everywhere else in the region, they are regarded as outcasts and outlaws, from Syria and Saudi Arabia to the UAE and Bahrain. They have zero chance of succeeding in a country like Lebanon, due to the towering presence of secular Sunnis like Saad al-Hariri and powerful Shiites like Hasan Nasrallah. That leaves them with Gaza, which they have ruled, via Hamas, since 2007. But that fiefdom might soon end, however, as Palestinians go to the polls to elect a new parliament and president. The Deal of the Century forced Hamas to temporarily reconcile with Fateh, which might lead to a power-sharing formula and eventually, and end the separation of Gaza. If that happens, then it would leave the MB with no options to turn to but Qatar and Turkey—their traditional safe havens since 2011. It would make the group increasingly reliant on Erdogan willing—perhaps more than ever—to answer to his beck and call. Muslim Brotherhood


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Sami Moubayed