Every so often something happens which marks a shift in traditional approaches to long-standing conflicts. Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel in November 1977 was one of those events - leading to the Camp David Accords the following year and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, which is still being respected over four decades later.

 On August 13, the dramatic announcement by President Donald Trump of a US-brokered agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel was another of those landmarks –with the potential to be followed by other Arab states.

 The “Abraham Accord” between Crown Prince Muhammed bin Zayyed Al Nahyan and Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu brings together two of the most advanced and powerful countries in the Middle East – despite their small size. Both leaders are eager to maintain good relations with Washington – whether or not Trump wins a second term in the White House.

 The agreement serves the interests of both parties but the Emirati side had a motive it could use to justify the move to critics: preventing unilateral Israeli annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank that the Likud leader had promised to implement after July 1^st.

 It is no secret that the two countries had already forged increasingly close and visible links in recent years. Security, technological and economic cooperation has reached unprecedented levels, driven in large part by shared hostility to Iran’s regional ambitions. Other Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, are more discreet. But the trend is clear.

 The UAE’s influential ambassador to the US, Yousef Al-Otaiba, wrote an article in a mass-circulation Hebrew newspaper in mid-June warning that annexation would prevent further normalization – providing an early clue to what happened just a few weeks later.

 Interpretations of what exactly has been agreed nevertheless differ. Trump stated flatly that annexation, approved in principle in his own “deal of the century,” was now off the table. UAE official statements and media coverage emphasized that point. Netanyahu insisted, however, that the domestically divisive and diplomatically damaging Israeli move had simply been postponed.

 Israelis were delighted at the news of their acceptance into the Middle East for the first time since 1994, when Jordan became the second Arab country to sign a peace treaty with the Jewish state. Criticism focused on their prime minister’s own motives: he is increasingly unpopular because of his handling of the Covid pandemic. He is also facing trial on corruption charges and is accused of manoeuvring for a fourth general election after three inconclusive ones over the past 18 months.

 Questions were also asked about whether the accord was intended to pave the way for the US sale of advanced F35 Stealth warplanes and drones to the UAE, over which Israel and its Congressional allies had hitherto exercised the right of veto. The issue there is that would undermine the hallowed principle of maintaining Israel’s “qualitative military edge.” (Israel got its own first F35s in late 2016).

 Palestinians were angry and dismayed, portraying normalization as a betrayal of their cause. The Palestinian Authority recalled its ambassador to Abu Dhabi. The key to their negative response was the sense of being abandoned by an influential Arab state, plus the implications for the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 (API), which conditioned recognition of Israel on its agreement to a viable and sovereign Palestinian state and a “just solution” of the refugee issue.

 In the view of some observers, however, the Emirati move may have a positive impact in making Palestinians more realistic about their future. Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, has long been discredited as a “subcontractor” of Israel’s 53-year occupation. People in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – especially the younger generation - are keen to see a change of strategy, including embracing the idea of one state with equal rights for the Jews and Arabs who inhabit the land “between the river and the sea.”

 Iran, along with its Lebanese proxy Hizbullah, was characteristically furious about the agreement, threatening retaliation against Abu Dhabi. Turkey – which enjoys the benefits of full diplomatic and economic relations with Israel – issued condemnatory statements that it was hard to see as anything other than hypocritical.  

 Saudi Arabia made clear that it would stand by the API. But a significant taboo has still been broken and an important precedent set. Bahrain, Oman, Sudan and Morocco are all thought likely to follow the Emirati lead.

 Anwar Gargash, the impressively articulate UAE minister of state for foreign affairs, struck an optimistic tone when he expressed the hope that his country, which has never been to war with Israel, would achieve a “warm peace” with the Jewish state – compared to what is often characterized as “cold peace” with Egypt and Jordan.

  But whether Israel will give up on annexation permanently or become genuinely committed to a viable two-state solution is another matter. Even if other Arab or Gulf states were to follow the Emirati example, Israelis and Palestinians would still need to fulfil the difficult task of coming to terms with each other. And that remains extremely challenging.

IAN BLACK