On November 27, when news broke about the assassination of the Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a chill descended on the Middle East. It felt like a dangerous spark that could ignite a destabilizing conflagration in the region in the final weeks of Donald Trump’s term in the White House.

 Iran quickly blamed Israel for targeting Fakhrizadeh – and not without reason. Binyamin Netanyahu, its prime minister, had named him in April 2018 when he unveiled the Mossad intelligence service’s sensational seizure of a trove of documents pertaining to Tehran’s clandestine nuclear program. Netanyahu reacted to the news of the killing by coyly saying that “he can’t tell all” about it. Other Israeli officials have not admitted their involvement, but neither – crucially - have they denied it.

 Experts have linked the assassination to last month’s reports of Trump’s consideration of military action against Iran. The New York Times quoted current and former US officials as saying the president had asked senior advisers whether he had options to target Iranian sites after UN inspectors reported a significant increase in the country’s stockpile of nuclear material.

 Advisers responded by warning that a strike against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities could easily escalate into a broader conflict. Whatever the truth of this report, by targeting a prominent figure in Iran’s nuclear programme, presumably with  a green light for Netanyahu, the Twitterer-in-chief in the Oval Office will make it far harder for his successor, Joe Biden, to persuade Iran to return to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

 The Democratic president-elect has repeatedly pledged to lift US sanctions if Tehran goes back to comply with the terms of the JCPoA, which was seen by Barack Obama – Biden’s old boss - as a high point of his multilateral foreign and security policy. Trump’s 2018 abandonment of the agreement – viewed by him as “the worst deal ever” – triggered tensions with NATO allies UK, France and Germany, as well as with Russia and China.

 Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPoA was interpreted – at least by Tehran - as proving Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's argument that the US cannot be trusted and that the nuclear issue is an American pretext to pressure Iran and prepare the groundwork for regime change.

 Four years of the Trump administration’s Iran policy culminated – publicly at least – in the January 3 assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force that runs regional Iranian Revolutionary Guard Force operations.  That was the visible and acknowledged peak of the “maximum pressure” campaign, but it was also followed by a wave of mysterious sabotage, fires and accidents at nuclear installations across the country, including at Natanz, the underground uranium enrichment plant.

  Still, this is not all about US or Israeli military or intelligence activities, whether clandestine or not. Other forms of pressure are economic sanctions, whose effect has been magnified by the spectacularly damaging corona pandemic.  And European countries have failed to find satisfactory compensation for Trump’s unilateral re-imposition of sanctions.

 It has also become painfully clear that Iran’s economic woes—especially the shrinking of its oil exports and its currency devaluation—are closely connected to key geopolitical events. Volatility in the exchange rate and currency depreciation are alarming signs of an unhealthy economy. “The enormous depreciation of the riyal against other currencies over the past decade illuminates the deterioration of Iran’s terms of trade versus the rest of the world,” argued two economists in a recent paper. No surprise that Trump’s defeat by Biden had a positive impact on Iran when the riyal briefly appreciated by another 10 percent.

  America’s regional diplomacy still seems focused on increasing Iran’s economic pain. If the Saudi blockade of Qatar is about to end – as a result of US and Kuwaiti intervention – then Tehran would face also significant losses since it has received nearly $100m from Qatar Airways in overflight fees.

 Biden is a very different story from Trump. His approach is to deal first and foremost with Iran’s nuclear program and afterwards try to curb its regional ambitions and missile program – which are of growing of concern to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel. The incoming president has said the US could restore sanctions under the terms of the deal should Iran resist further negotiations.

 Tehran has countered by insisting that it should be compensated for the damage done to its economy by the US sanctions so far – which is highly unlikely. Another important domestic factor is that time is limited to while Hassan Rouhani remains in office, as the next presidential elections are in June 2021. Hardliners, including Hossein Dehghan, backed by the IRGC and Khamenei, look set to win.

 US officials are already said to be especially nervous about January 3 2021– the first anniversary of the Qassem Soleimani drone strike in Baghdad. Biden is now on course for the White House and Trump is on his way out. The transition will be over on January 20. But there is still no guarantee that this hyper-sensitive issue will not ignite a damaging regional blaze – sooner or later.

BY:IAN BLACK