Turkey’s current incursion into Northern Syria, which began in earnest on October 9th, has produced numerous negative reactions throughout the world as did the American withdrawal of their modest force fighting alongside the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) militia. For many observers the American withdrawal was a betrayal of an ally that did much of the heavy lifting in the fight to eliminate the radical Islamist Daesh.

Turkish Perspective

In spite of world criticism of Turkey’s action seeking to clear out some of the border areas in north-eastern Syria, senior Turkish MFA officials have confided that Turkey, for years, has been fighting a number of terrorist organizations that present risk and threat to their national security. It is with this understanding that Turkey gave its full support to all international efforts to this end since day one – including the International Coalition Against DAESH. Having successfully concluded Operation Euphrates Shield in 2017 and Operation Olive Branch in 2018, Turkey cleared an area over 4.000 km2 from DEASH and PYD/YPG terror, allowing more than 360,000 Syrians to return to their homes in this area. Those 360,000 returned voluntarily. They did not stay in Turkey or travel to Europe.

In the meantime, the Turks maintain that the threat of terrorism originating from Syria and targeting its borders has not yet ended. According to Turkish officials, during the last two years, PYD/YPG has perpetrated more than 320 terrorist attacks targeting Turkey or Syrians within Syria. Over a hundred of these cases targeted Turkey from the east of River Euphrates. Through tunnels dug by PYD/YPG along the bordering areas in this region, explosives and ammunition have been smuggled into Turkey to be handed over to the PKK terrorist organization. Furthermore, the Turks assert that there is credible evidence that DEASH terrorists detained by PYD/YPG were released in exchange of infiltrating into Turkey or northwest Syria in order to conduct terrorist acts.

The Turkish authorities further allege that there has been growing evidence about PYD/YPG’s human rights violations such as recruiting child soldiers, intimidating dissidents, demographic engineering and forced conscription in areas under its control.

The Americans

Middle Eastern actors have long underestimated the extent and nature of American isolationism in the world. Historically, it has benefitted from substantial domestic support especially amongst blue collar Republican voters, the very people who today constitute the power base of President Donald Trump. It is therefore not surprising to see the American withdrawal from Syria. On the one hand, since Russia’s intervention in 2015, Syria has never been more than a side show for the American military. Ever since the 2011 Arab spring, it was clear regardless of the political stripe that was in the White House, America would not challenge Russian and Iranian designs on Syria and their significant efforts to support the Bashar al-Assad regime.

There is little doubt that abandoning their Kurdish allies on the field would produce negative reactions and possible even lead to a resurgence of DAESH. There is however precedent for the transition from Obama’s ‘leading from behind’ international strategy to Trump’s ‘get out fast’ theories. Similar choices can be seen in US efforts to disengage from Afghanistan and their constant criticism of NATO allies about contributing to their own and Europe’s self-defense. It remains to be seen whether American isolationism will bring about a more stable Middle East but the positive side is reserved for domestic political gain. Short sightedness abroad has short term domestic political gains on the American political chess board.

Bashar al-Assad’s Syria

The current goal of the Bashar al-Assad regime is to exert complete control over all Syrian territory. As such, the recent Turkish incursion and American withdrawal have allowed Bashar to move his military forward into territory close to the Turkish border formerly held by SDF. The remaining Syrian opposition stronghold of Idlib, in northern Syria, is now threatened. These developments have allowed Bashar to enter into a pact with the Kurdish SDF militia given the absence of any continuing of US support on the ground. Together Bashar’s government troops and the Syrian Kurds can now square off against the Turks in northern Syria.

However, Bashar is far from having his hands free. He is wholly dependent on Russian and Iranian support to buttress his military presence. Without it, Bashar’s own domestic military would be unable to even attempt to control its own territory. Moreover, the Turkish incursion was doubtless sanctioned by the Astana Group (Russia, Iran, Turkey) as witnessed by the absence of Russian air power over the skies of northern Syria during the Turkish incursion. Bashar’s objective of imposing hegemony over all Syria is manifestly not shared yet by the Astana Group. The desire of the Kurds to create a homeland for themselves is also not a priority for this alliance.

The Kurds

Recent history has not been generous to the Kurds or their political cause. In 1919, despite high hopes put forward by the Wilsonian doctrine, the Kurds were denied a homeland with a defined territory. The Westphalian model of international reality was just too strong and proponents of the Kurdish cause were unable to wield sufficient power to impose their will. This curse of not being able to have a regional champion has continued. Most Turkish political parties even the Kemalists dislike the Kurds and blame the PKK for destabilizing any neo-Ottoman resurgence. Iran’s Shia regime is anathema to Kurds, most of who are Sunni Muslims, and of a different ethnic origin than most Iranians. Iraq’s Saddam Hussein punished the Kurds after the US invasion with poison gas as President Bush senior watched on. Under the Assad regime, the Kurds were mostly unemployed and stateless individuals. They were treated as untermenschen.

There was a historic opportunity to reverse these failures though. In 2011, the Syrian uprising against the Bashar al -Assad regime offered the Kurds a unique opportunity to unite with their Sunni opposition compatriots and overturn the Assad dictatorship. At this historic moment, they waffled. The Kurdish youth were supportive but the old guard remained aloof and refused to commit themselves. The response of the Syrian Christians was similar. In doing so, the Kurds lost the opportunity to create some regional élan. The American withdrawal of support and the pact with Bashar reaffirm a self-fulfilling prophecy of betrayal and resentment. It only magnified the suspicion of every regional state about any national loyaltythe Kurds may have amongst neighboring states.

So, for now, the Kurds remain divided amongst themselves. The plethora of Kurdish political parties only confirms the obvious. The experiment in Irbid, the de-facto Kurdish capital of northern Iraq, is racked by traditional family and tribal corruption. The PKK is a political dinosaur that has yet to grow out of its Marxist straight-jacket. The YPG have their backs to the wall betrayed by their International benefactor, and now at the mercy of their regional enemies once again.

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Groupe Mackenzie-Papineau

Bruce Mabley, Phd.