Since the outbreak of the first spark of the Syrian armed conflict in 2012, the term “political transition” has become common and widely used by global, regional and local involved actors in the Syrian crisis. From 2012 until 2015, 13 resolutions had been issued by the UN Security Council regarding different aspects of the Syrian dilemma including 2254 which was about the process of a political transition, but without any outcomes. On the contrary, since then, the posture in Syria is getting worse and more complicated and the prospects of a political transition have waned.

A political transition can be defined as an act or process of changing from a form of totalitarian rule to a democratic or quasi-democratic rule that believes in human rights and the rule of law. This initial definition indicates that political transition is associated with democracy and constitutes a vital part of the process of democratisation. This, in turn, suggests that the concept and process of political transition can live and succeed only in a democratic or semi-democratic environment. Put differently, a political transition can only be accomplished if conflicting parties believe in democracy in its minimum levels.

Any successful political transition in the countries that have been experiencing armed conflicts, like Syria, requires a set of conditions to be achieved. On the one hand, some of these stipulations are objective and linked to international and regional players embroiled in this stalemate. On the other hand, the rest of these requirements are subjective and related to Syrian local warring parties. These fighting groups, in turn, reflect the Syrian society in terms of culture and the extent of its acceptance of democracy and the principle of a political settlement to this bloody dispute.

The external players engaged in the Syrian dilemma have no consensus yet about the necessity of the solution of a political transition in Syria. On the contrary, these global and regional actors have practically worked for the opposite side, namely, the prolongation of the strife in Syria in harmony with their interests at the expense of Syrian people.

Every single country participating in the Syrian calamity has goals and agendas that contradict the principle of a settlement based on a political transition.

Russia, which has been the major participant in the Syrian catastrophe, has aimed to protect and maintain al-Assad’s regime. This has been at the expense of the devastating of more than half of Syria, killing about one million people, and displacing more than ten million internally and externally. In other words, Russia has aimed to safeguard and sustain the Al-Alawite regime.

Turkey, the primary incubator of the political and armed Syrian opposition, has had sectarian objectives represented in supporting the Sunni’s dissenters and establishing an Islamic rule in Damascus led by the Muslim Brotherhood in the general framework of Erdogan’s plan to retrieve the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Turkey has aided Islamic terrorist and extremist groups including ISIS and Al-Nusra. Especially, when Turkey’s interests have intersected with ISIS and other extremist groups in fighting Kurdish aspirations in Syria.

Iran’s role in Syria resembles Turkey’s role because Iran has had sectarian agendas like Turkey, but in the favour of the idea of spreading Shiism across the Middle East. Based on this basis, Iran has been supporting al-Assad’s regime with money, militias, and weapons.

The Syrian warring parties do not believe in the idea of a political transition because it is a democratic process and the two conflicting parties, i.e., the regime and the opposition, are inveterate enemies of democracy. Each party of them, particularly, the regime has already decided to eliminate the other. At the time of talking about the idea of political transition, the regime has strived to tighten the screws on Idlib, the last stronghold of the Islamist extremist opposition backed by Turkey. In return, the armed Syrian opposition has cooperated with Turkey to occupy more Syrian lands and undermine Kurdish-led Self-administration in north and northeast Syria.

Based on the aforementioned, the prospects for the success of political transition in Syria are almost non-existent. The most important factors for the success of any political transition in Syria are completely absent. There are no neutral international forces on the ground to impose any political compromise built on a political transition. On the opposite of that, there are biased global and regional forces to defend either the regime or the opposition. Likewise, the warring local parties have no willingness about the need for a political transition. Similarly, there is no unanimity among international and regional powers involved in the Syrian impasse over the significance of the ultimate compromise and peaceful political transition. All the conditions mentioned above are not in existence in the case of Syria. Hence, it is very difficult to talk at present about any fruitful political transition project in Syria.